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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, 
 Before us are an appeal and a cross-appeal arising 
from an action brought by attorney Benjamin Post (“Post”) 
against his legal malpractice insurer, St. Paul Travelers 
Insurance Company (“Travelers”), for, among other things, 
insurance bad faith and breach of contract.  The District Court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Travelers on the bad 
faith claim, the order from which Post now appeals.  
Travelers appeals the District Court’s damage award of 
$921,862.38 to Post for breach of contract.   
Circuit Judge 
 Post argues that his bad faith claim was erroneously 
dismissed at summary judgment, and asserts, among other 
things, that there was sufficient evidence to create a genuine 
issue of material fact that Travelers lacked a reasonable basis 
to deny coverage.  Travelers contends that the District Court 
erred by awarding damages on Post’s breach of contract claim 
because the malpractice insurance policy contained an 
explicit coverage exclusion for sanctions proceedings.   
 For the reasons stated below, we affirm the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment in Travelers’ favor on 
Post’s bad faith claim, but we vacate and remand with respect 
to the District Court’s damage award for breach of contract. 
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I. Factual and Procedural Background 
 A. 
 In 2003, Post and Tara Reid, both employed at the 
time by the law firm of Post & Schell, P.C., were retained to 
defend Mercy Hospital-Wilkes Barre, Mercy Healthcare 
Partners, and Catholic Healthcare Partners (collectively, 
“Mercy”) in a medical malpractice action filed in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, captioned 
Bobbett, et al. v. Grabowski, et al., Case No. 4310-C-2003.   
The Bobbett Case 
 In May 2005, Post left Post & Schell to start a new law 
firm with his wife—Post & Post, L.L.C.  Thereafter, he 
continued to represent Mercy in the Bobbett matter, and Reid 
joined Post & Post as an associate.          
 Trial of the Bobbett case began in September 2005.  
During its first week, the plaintiffs introduced evidence 
suggesting that Post and Reid had engaged in misconduct 
during discovery.  Specifically, on Friday, September 23, 
2005, plaintiffs’ counsel examined a risk manager, Anne 
Marie Zimmerman, regarding allegedly undisclosed 
redactions from medical policies produced by Mercy in 
discovery.  Zimmerman testified that Post and Reid were 
responsible for the redactions.  Plaintiffs’ counsel 
characterized Zimmerman’s testimony as “establish[ing] that 
[Post and Reid] covertly redacted and withheld information 
from documents . . . , and/or simply failed to produce 
requested documents without permission from this Court 
and/or notice to Plaintiffs’ counsel.”  Plaintiffs’ counsel then 
suggested to the presiding Judge, Hon. Peter Paul Olszewski, 
Jr., that the trial be adjourned for the day.  On learning of this 
possible discovery misconduct, Mercy replaced Post as its 
counsel.     
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 Fearing that the jury now believed that there had been 
a “cover-up” involving its lawyers, and concerned with the 
“substantial potential of uninsured punitive exposure,” 
Mercy, represented by new counsel, began settlement 
negotiations with the plaintiffs over the weekend.  The 
negotiations resulted in a settlement of $11 million, which 
represented the full extent of Mercy’s medical malpractice 
policy limits.  The settlement was presented to Judge 
Olszewski in court on Tuesday, September 27, 2005.  It 
included a release among the parties, but with one significant 
caveat:  the settlement agreement did not release Post, Reid, 
Post & Schell, and/or Post & Post from any liability they, or 
any of them, might have to Mercy for malpractice.  Mercy did 
in fact threaten Post with a malpractice suit.   
 B. 
 Post & Schell was insured against claims of legal 
malpractice by Travelers under Policy #GL09000524 (the 
“Policy”).  The Policy had an annual premium of $226,500, 
and had an occurrence and aggregate limit of $10,000,000.  
The Policy insured the firm and “protected persons” (i.e., the 
firm’s attorneys) against “claims” and “suits” asserting 
malpractice.  It thus insured Post for any alleged acts within 
the scope of coverage occurring (1) during the Policy’s term 
and (2) while Post was employed by Post & Schell.     
The Policy 
 The Policy defines a “claim” as a “demand that seeks 
damages.”  It states that a claim is considered “to be first 
made or brought” (1) on the date that Travelers or any 
protected person “first receives written notice of such claim,” 
or (2) when Travelers receives written notice from a protected 
person “of a specific wrongful act that caused the loss which 
resulted in such claim or suit.”  A “suit” is “a civil proceeding 
that seeks damages.”   
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 The Policy imposes on Travelers the “duty to defend 
any protected person against a claim or suit . . . even if any of 
the allegations of such claim or suit are groundless, false, or 
fraudulent.”  Travelers’ duty to defend expressly includes the 
duty to pay “defense expenses incurred by, or for, the 
protected person for the claim or suit.”  “Defense expenses” 
are “fees, costs, and expenses that result directly from the 
investigation, defense, or appeal of a specific claim or suit,” 
including “[f]ees, costs, and expenses of hired or appointed 
attorneys” and “[t]he cost of the proceedings involved in the 
suit, including court reporter’s, arbitrator’s and mediator’s 
fees.”  The Policy excludes from its definition of “damages” 
any “civil or criminal fines, forfeitures, penalties, or sanctions 
. . . .”  It does not define “sanctions.”     
 The Policy provides in pertinent part as follows: 
Lawyers professional liability. 
We’ll pay amounts any protected 
person is legally required to pay 
as damages for covered loss that: 
What This Agreement Covers 
• results from the performance 
of, or failure to perform, legal 
services by or on behalf of 
any protected person; and 
  
• is caused by a wrongful act 
committed on or after any 
retroactive date that applies 
and before the ending date of 
this agreement.   
 
* * * * * 
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  Damages means: 
 
• compensatory damages 
imposed by law; and 
 
• punitive or exemplary 
damages imposed by law if 
such damages are insurable 
under the law that applies. 
 
But we won’t consider damages 
to include any: 
 
• civil or criminal fines, 
forfeitures, penalties, or 
sanctions; or 
 
• legal fees charged or incurred 
by any protected person. 
* * * * * 
Defense expenses means the 
following fees, costs, and 
expenses that result directly from 
the investigation, defense, or 
appeal of a specific claim or suit: 
 
• Fees, costs, and expenses of 
hired or appointed attorneys. 
 
• The cost of the proceedings 
involved in the suit, including 
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court reporter’s, arbitrator’s, 
and mediator’s fees. 
 
• Fees for witnesses. 
 
• Independent expert’s and 
special investigator’s fees, 
costs, and expenses. 
* * * * * 
  Exclusions – What This Agreement Won’t  
  
Criminal, dishonest, or 
fraudulent wrongful acts or 
knowing violation of rights or 
laws.  We won’t cover loss that 
results from any criminal, 
dishonest, or fraudulent wrongful 
act or any knowing violation of 
rights or laws committed by: 
Cover 
• any protected person; or 
 
• anyone with the consent or 
knowledge of any protected 
person. 
 C. 
 On Sunday, September 25, 2005, James Saxton, an 
attorney with the law firm of Stevens & Lee, Mercy’s newly 
retained counsel, advised Post’s father, Barton Post, that 
Mercy intended to bring a lawsuit for legal malpractice 
against Post, and that the claim should be reported to Post’s 
Mercy’s Legal Malpractice Claim Against Post 
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insurance carrier.  Saxton asked for the name of the insurance 
carrier so that he could make a report.     
 Michael Williams, Vice President for Risk and 
Insurance for Catholic Healthcare Partners, sent two letters on 
October 6 to Post advising him that he was terminated as 
Mercy’s counsel and instructing him not to destroy any 
documents from the Bobbett case.     
 On October 12, Williams sent Post a third letter, this 
time asserting that the Bobbett settlement was forced on 
Mercy because the alleged “cover-up” by Post and Reid 
during discovery had caused Mercy “substantial . . . 
uninsured punitive exposure.”     
 Williams stated the following:  
[W]hat clearly drove the 
settlement was the damage done 
during the testimony of Anne 
Marie Zimmerman regarding the 
document production issues raised 
during her testimony.  More 
specifically is the fact that there 
was a claim in front of the jury 
that there was a “cover-up” that 
appeared to involve our lawyers.  
Further, under those 
circumstances and knowing that 
Ms. Zimmerman would likely 
invoke her Fifth Amendment right 
or testify under immunity, we 
absolutely disagree regarding 
your ability to rehabilitate.  There 
were other aggravating factors 
that occurred involving you, your 
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father and other members of your 
firm; however, this is not the time 
to review them. 
An unprecedented and certainly 
unanticipated situation arose in 
which Mercy employees needed 
to retain criminal counsel as 
directly related to the issue of 
redacted policies and procedures; 
policies and procedures that you 
admitted had been redacted, 
notwithstanding your position that 
such was not relevant.  In fact, 
those redactions were most 
relevant and[,] as a result, an 
irreconcilable conflict developed 
with your firm, all of which put us 
at tremendous risk.  In light of 
these dramatic developments, the 
physicians’ insurers all tendered 
their policy limits and were 
prepared to take a joint 
tortfeasor’s release.  We 
determined the case had to be 
settled to protect not only the 
assets of the Trust but to eliminate 
the substantial potential of 
uninsured punitive exposure 
resulting from the actions of your 
firm. 
 On October 20, 2005, Williams again wrote to Post, 
stating: 
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Pursuant to our internal protocols, 
your former clients, Catholic 
Healthcare Partners, Mercy 
Health Partners, and Mercy 
Hospital Wilkes-Barre are 
providing you with a copy of the 
executed Release in the above 
captioned matter.  We ask that 
you note the carve-out for third-
party claims.  
Please notify your professional 
liability insurer of this, and ask a 
representative of that Company to 
contact me upon receipt. 
 On October 27, Post & Schell notified Travelers that 
Mercy had retained Stevens & Lee as its counsel “to review 
the matter for possible professional malpractice implications.”  
Post & Schell enclosed the aforementioned letters sent by 
Williams.   
 George Bochetto, counsel for Post, sent a letter to 
Travelers on November 3 to put it “on notice of a claim or 
potential claim” against Post.  He enclosed the October 20 
letter from Williams.  On receipt of the letter (which was 
contemporaneous with its receipt of the October 27 letter 
from Post & Schell), Travelers opened a claims file for Post.     
 Michael Spinelli, a senior claims specialist in 
Travelers’ New York office, assumed responsibility for the 
claim.  During the month of November, Spinelli had 
numerous conversations and at least one email exchange with 
Post & Schell partner William Sutton regarding Travelers’ 
retention of counsel to represent the firm in connection with 
Mercy’s malpractice claim.  There is no evidence that Spinelli 
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communicated with Bochetto or Post during this time, not 
even to acknowledge receipt of the claim.  This was despite a 
Travelers’ policy providing that 
[t]he claims professional is 
instructed to attempt to contact 
the insured within 24 hours of 
receiving the claim to introduce 
yourself to the insured, 
acknowledge that you have 
received the claim and to speak 
with them to find out more 
information so you could assist 
the insured in the handling of the 
matter.     
 On November 18, 2005, Saxton wrote to Bochetto to 
place Post on notice again of Mercy’s malpractice claim.  In 
relevant part, Saxton’s letter stated: 
As a follow-up to the various 
letters and discussions regarding 
this matter, please be advised that 
[Mercy] is in the process of 
assigning counsel to pursue its 
claims against its former counsel 
in the Bobbett case.  However, 
before getting too far into the 
litigation process, I wanted to 
further discuss a meeting of the 
stakeholders that you first 
proposed verbally to my partner, 
Jim Schwartzman, Esquire.  
While [Mercy] is moving forward 
with preparation for litigation, it 
remains open to a good-faith 
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meeting to discuss possible 
resolution prior to suit being filed.   
To that end, they will need certain 
information from you, namely 
confirmation that you notified 
your client’s insurers regarding 
the potential claim, the name of 
the insurance carriers, and the 
name of the claims representative, 
if assigned.  
  D. 
 On November 21, 2005, the plaintiffs in the Bobbett 
case filed a 108-page petition for sanctions against Post, Reid, 
Barton Post, and Post & Post.  Post & Schell was not named 
as a respondent.  In the petition, the plaintiffs claimed that 
Post and Reid violated the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the Rules of Professional Conduct in their 
handling of discovery by (1) failing to produce and/or 
producing altered versions of responsive documents, and (2) 
misrepresenting to the plaintiffs and the Court what 
documents Mercy had in its possession.  They asserted also 
that Post and Reid had engaged in “dilatory, obdurate, 
vexatious, and/or bad faith conduct.”  The discovery 
misconduct allegedly occurred while Post and Reid were with 
Post & Schell and also while with Post & Post.  The plaintiffs 
sought sanctions against each defendant, as well as “any other 
relief this court deems just and equitable . . . .”   
The Sanctions Petition 
 By letter dated November 28, 2005, Bochetto advised 
Travelers of the sanctions petition and, pursuant to the Policy, 
requested that Travelers pay for Post’s defense costs and 
indemnify Post with respect to the petition.  After receiving 
Bochetto’s letter seeking a defense to the petition for 
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sanctions, Spinelli had a “lengthy discussion” with Bochetto’s 
partner, Jeffrey Ogren, on December 1, 2005 about the 
Bobbett case, the sanctions petition, and Mercy’s malpractice 
claim.  Post contended that Mercy made a malpractice claim 
that was covered by the Policy.  Spinelli’s view was that the 
sanctions petition only sought relief in the form of sanctions, 
which are expressly excluded under the Policy.  As such, 
Spinelli’s inclination was to deny coverage.     
 On December 1, Travelers retained attorney Mark 
Anesh, a partner with the insurance defense firm of Wilson 
Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker, as outside counsel to 
advise it on its defense and coverage obligations with regard 
to Post.  Anesh is a New York attorney not licensed to 
practice law in Pennsylvania.  Despite the fact that Spinelli’s 
general practice was to provide coverage counsel with 
“anything and everything” he had, he did not provide Anesh 
with any information regarding the allegations that Mercy 
made in October and November.  Spinelli did not even advise 
Anesh of Mercy’s letters.  Rather, Spinelli sent Anesh only 
the petition for sanctions and other documents relating to the 
Bobbett case, and Spinelli asked Anesh only for his opinion 
on whether there was coverage in connection with the 
sanctions petition alone.  Thus, in forming his opinion, Anesh 
was not aware that a claim for legal malpractice had been 
lodged beforehand by Mercy, nor was he aware that the 
factual allegations in the sanctions petition were identical to 
the factual allegations underlying Mercy’s malpractice claim.  
Likewise, Anesh was not aware that Mercy had retained 
counsel to pursue its legal malpractice claim.     
 After Anesh reviewed the materials given to him and 
determined Travelers was not obligated to defend or 
indemnify Post with respect to the allegations against him in 
the petition for sanctions, he informed Bochetto by a 
December 8 letter that this was Travelers’ conclusion.  Anesh 
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also told Bochetto that Travelers had received a draft of the 
sanctions petition on October 31, 2005, three weeks before it 
had been filed.  Anesh explained the declining of coverage as 
follows: 
The sole and complete relief 
sought by the petition at issue is 
not for Damages as they are 
defined in the Policy, but for 
sanctions.  Since sanctions are not 
included in the definition of 
Damages under the Policy, no 
coverage, either for defense or 
indemnity, will be afforded for the 
above mentioned petition or any 
hearing subsequently scheduled to 
address the contents of the 
petition.  Furthermore, a Claim is 
defined in the Policy as a 
“demand that seeks damages”.  
Therefore, your request for 
defense and indemnity of the 
sanctions petition is not a Claim 
as defined in the Policy. 
 Travelers reserved its rights to deny coverage on 
several other bases, including the exclusion for “loss that 
results from any criminal, dishonest, or fraudulent wrongful 
act or any knowing violation of rights or laws.”  Nonetheless, 
Anesh stated that Travelers was willing to reconsider its 
decision if other information warranted it.   
 In a letter dated December 19, 2005, Bochetto, on 
Post’s behalf, requested that Travelers reconsider its denial of 
coverage for the sanctions petition, arguing that Travelers 
erred on each basis it denied coverage.  Travelers determined 
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that a change in coverage position was not warranted, and 
again denied that it owed any defense or coverage obligation 
to Post.   
 Post & Schell took the same coverage position as Post, 
notwithstanding that the sanctions petition did not even name 
the firm as a respondent.  Post & Schell contended that 
Mercy’s claim for malpractice against it and Post was “so 
intertwined” with the sanctions petition that Post & Schell’s 
fees and costs incurred in the latter (responding to a document 
subpoena and a potential claim by Post for contribution in the 
event sanctions were imposed on him) should be paid by 
Travelers.  Travelers responded that the Policy did not cover 
legal fees and costs that the firm incurred in connection with 
the sanctions proceedings.     
 E. 
 From the onset of the sanctions proceedings, Mercy 
participated in conferences with Judge Olszewski, insisted on 
receiving copies of all discovery produced by Post, and  
attended depositions relating to the sanctions petition.            
Mercy Joins In The Sanctions Proceedings 
 On January 20, 2006, Mercy sought to question Post 
during his deposition.  Post’s counsel objected to the 
questioning on the basis that Mercy was not a party to the 
petition for sanctions.  The parties could not resolve this 
discovery dispute on their own and turned to Judge Olszewski 
to resolve it.  He decided to permit Mercy to participate in the 
sanctions proceedings on the condition that Mercy file an 
answer to the sanctions petition.  On January 30, 2006, 
Bochetto wrote to Travelers to inform it of Mercy’s 
intervention in the sanctions proceedings.  Travelers did not 
respond.   
17 
 
 Mercy filed an answer to the petition on February 8, 
2006.  It joined in the sanctions proceedings because it “was 
required to participate in the search, review and production of 
documents, and to produce witnesses for depositions.”  In 
addition, Mercy had an “important interest” in the plaintiffs’ 
request for sanctions because it was “the misconduct of 
[Mercy’s] former counsel that [was] at issue.”  Mercy’s 
answer admitted that Post and Reid had engaged in discovery 
violations—without Mercy’s participation—and that those 
violations had prejudiced the plaintiffs.  Mercy alleged that 
Post had withheld information that he “knew[ ] or should 
have known” was discoverable, and had “produced 
incomplete copies of policies and/or covered up discoverable 
information on policies . . . .”  It was in this context that 
Mercy claimed it joined the plaintiffs’ request for sanctions.  
Mercy’s prayer for relief “request[ed] that th[e] Court hold an 
evidentiary hearing and sanction [Post and Reid] for their 
conduct, and to enter any other relief [that] this Court 
deem[ed] just and equitable under the unique and serious 
circumstances presented before it, and award costs, attorneys’ 
fees and expenses.”     
 During his deposition in February 2006, Mercy Chief 
Executive Officer James May confirmed that Mercy was 
seeking money damages in the sanctions proceedings—for, 
among other things, the amount of the settlement and the 
negative publicity—on account of Post’s alleged misconduct.      
 On February 20, 2006, Bochetto again wrote to 
Travelers, this time to notify it of Mercy’s answer to and 
joinder in the sanctions petition, as well as May’s deposition 
testimony, all of which made clear that Mercy was seeking 
money damages in the sanctions proceedings.  Post and Reid 
sought a defense to Mercy’s answer to the sanctions petition.    
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 Spinelli and Anesh reviewed Mercy’s answer and 
determined that, like the petition for sanctions itself, it did not 
trigger coverage because it did not allege a claim for 
“damages” as defined by the Policy.  Anesh informed 
Bochetto of Travelers’ coverage decision.        
 F. The Travelers-Post Letter Agreement
 Despite concluding that it owed no defense or 
indemnity obligation to Post, Travelers attempted to reach an 
accommodation with Post that would reimburse him for some 
portion of the defense costs related to the sanctions 
proceedings.  Travelers did so because, while expressly 
reserving its rights on the issue of coverage, it recognized that 
(1) there was significant overlap between the sanctions 
proceedings and Mercy’s threatened malpractice suit, and (2) 
what transpired during the sanctions proceedings could have 
an effect on the future malpractice suit with regard to which 
Travelers arguably would owe defense and indemnity 
obligations.   
   
 To that end, in the spring of 2006 Anesh had two 
meetings with counsel for Post, Reid, and Post & Schell to 
discuss Travelers’ payment of some of their attorneys’ fees 
despite its denial of coverage.  Bochetto testified that, at the 
second meeting, Anesh agreed that Travelers would pay a 
“very substantial” amount of the legal fees incurred to date, 
an amount that Bochetto understood to be “in the range of 
hundreds of thousands of dollars.”  However, Bochetto 
admitted that Anesh “[n]ever promised . . . an exact dollar 
amount . . . [and that a] specific dollar amount was not 
mentioned.”     
 On May 3, 2006, Anesh wrote to Bochetto and Gary 
Figore (Reid’s counsel) offering to pay Post’s and Reid’s 
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attorneys’ fees in connection with the sanctions proceedings 
as follows: 
• Travelers would pay an hourly 
rate of $225 for partners, $175 
for senior associates, and $150 
for junior associates; 
 
• Travelers would only pay for 
legal services provided on or 
after December 15, 2005; 
 
• Travelers would only 
reimburse for attorney time 
“expended to defend potential 
legal malpractice claims”; and 
 
• The $100,000 deductible 
would have to be exhausted 
prior to reimbursement. 
 In consideration for this payment, Post would have to 
waive any claim for payment of attorneys’ fees and expenses 
in the context of the sanctions proceedings except as payable 
under the letter agreement.   
 Post agreed to the terms of the offer letter and 
submitted invoices to Travelers for over $400,000 in fees 
related to the sanctions proceedings, which amount included 
over $250,000 in fees incurred in the sanctions proceedings 
prior to Mercy filing its answer to the petition.   
 After reviewing the invoices, Anesh wrote to Bochetto 
on July 26, 2006 stating that Travelers would pay the amount 
of $36,220.26.  Anesh explained that the reduction in fees—
from the more than $400,000 in invoices submitted—resulted 
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from Travelers’ implementation of the terms of the offer letter 
as it had interpreted them.   
 The next day Bochetto wrote to Anesh rejecting 
Travelers’ offer of payment and stating that he was 
“genuinely offended by the contents of [the] letter” and that 
the suggestion that “only $35,000 (out of over $400,000 in 
fees and expenses) are reimbursable . . . is beyond ludicrous.”     
 In August and September 2006, the parties to the 
sanctions proceedings began discussing the possibility of a 
mediation that would “encompass the sanctions matter and 
the potential legal malpractice action.”  In light of this 
development, Anesh wrote to Bochetto and Figore stating that 
Travelers “agree[d] to pay for fifty per cent (50%) of 
reasonable preparation time and attendance at the mediation.”  
The mediation was scheduled for late November 2006.    
 G. 
 In the fall of 2006, Post filed a lawsuit against the 
Bobbetts’ lawyer, Joseph Quinn, for defamation and tortious 
interference in order to create leverage to persuade Quinn to 
withdraw the sanctions petition.  Post believed that, if this 
tactic succeeded and the Bobbetts discontinued the sanctions 
proceedings, Mercy would no longer be able to use the 
sanctions proceedings to obtain discovery against Post in aid 
of its malpractice claim without the burdens and costs of 
filing a direct action for malpractice.  Post’s lawsuit achieved 
its purpose—on March 23, 2007, the Bobbetts withdrew their 
sanctions petition with prejudice.      
The Bobbetts Withdraw The Sanctions Petition 
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 H. Mercy Files A Praecipe For Writ Of Summons  
  Against Post
 In late summer 2007, Mercy offered to mediate its 
malpractice claim against Post without resorting to litigation.  
Post agreed and demanded that Travelers assume all legal 
fees incurred by him in connection therewith.  Travelers 
responded that it had no duty to represent Post in the 
mediation nor to reimburse him for the legal fees incurred in 
connection with it.  Instead, Travelers made a “courtesy” 
offer of $3,000 as a “good faith gesture.”  Bochetto rejected 
this offer, describing it as an “absurdity.”   It almost goes 
without saying that the mediation between Mercy and Post 
was unsuccessful. 
  
 On November 19, 2007, Mercy filed a praecipe for 
writ of summons against Post in the Court of Common Pleas 
of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania.  The following February, 
Post filed a praecipe for writ of summons against Mercy in 
Philadelphia County.  In November 2008, final agreement 
was reached among all involved parties—Mercy, Post & 
Schell, Post, Reid, and Travelers—for discontinuance, with 
prejudice, of these two actions.  No money was paid to any 
person or entity by or on behalf of Post or Post & Schell in 
consideration for the mutual discontinuances.        
 I. 
 On October 13, 2006, Post filed a complaint in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania against Travelers, Liberty Surplus Insurance 
Company, and Lexington Insurance Company.  Liberty 
Surplus and Lexington (Post & Schell’s excess insurers) were 
dismissed from the case in January 2007.   
This Lawsuit 
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 On February 7, 2008, Post filed an amended complaint 
against Travelers wherein he asserted five claims.  Count I 
was for breach of contract based on Travelers’ alleged breach 
of the Policy.  Count II also was for breach of contract, but 
was based on Travelers’ putative breach of an oral agreement 
between Bochetto and Anesh that Travelers would pay the 
costs incurred by Post in connection with the sanctions 
proceedings.  Count III asserted a claim for insurance bad 
faith pursuant to 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8371.  In Count IV, 
Post asserted promissory estoppel, contending that Travelers 
promised to cover his defense costs in connection with the 
sanctions proceedings and that Post reasonably relied on 
Travelers’ promise to his detriment.  Finally, Count V sought 
a declaratory judgment that Post was entitled to coverage for 
defense costs he incurred in connection with the sanctions 
proceedings.    
 On June 30, 2008, Travelers moved for partial 
summary judgment as to Post’s claims for breach of contract, 
insurance bad faith and declaratory judgment (Counts I, II, 
III, and V), asserting that its duty to defend Post was not 
triggered by the Bobbetts’ sanctions petition or by Mercy’s 
answer to it because these pleadings related only to sanctions, 
and sanctions are expressly excluded from coverage under the 
Policy.     
 On July 31, 2008, Post filed a cross-motion for partial 
summary judgment as to his breach of contract and 
declaratory judgment claims (Counts I, II, and V).  He 
argued, among other things, that Travelers was legally 
required to defend and indemnify him in connection with the 
sanctions proceedings because (1) Mercy’s malpractice claim, 
which predated the sanctions petition, triggered coverage, (2) 
the malpractice claim and the sanctions proceedings involved 
the same facts and were interrelated, and (3) Mercy was using 
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the sanctions proceedings to further its claim of legal 
malpractice.       
 On January 7, 2009, the District Court entered an 
Explanation And Order denying Travelers’ motion for 
partial summary judgment and granting in part Post’s cross-
motion.  Specifically, the Court denied Travelers’ motion for 
summary judgment as to Counts I and V with prejudice, and 
denied that motion as to Counts II and III without prejudice.  
It granted Post’s cross-motion as to Counts I and V, and 
denied it as to Count II without prejudice.  The Court held 
that the Policy covered the sanctions petition, and explained 
in pertinent part as follows: 
First, . . . Mercy’s malpractice 
claim triggered a duty to defend 
that included the sanctions 
petition after Mercy joined 
because that petition was involved 
in the covered claim.  As long as 
Mercy’s malpractice claim could 
have resulted in covered loss, 
[Travelers] had a duty to defend 
all proceedings involved in that 
claim. 
. . . 
Second, even if the sanctions 
petition were not part of Mercy’s 
claim, the petition was not 
excluded by the Liability Policy 
after Mercy joined the petition.  
The sanctions exclusion in the 
Liability Policy does not exclude 
sanctions petitions brought or 
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joined by an attorney’s former 
client. . . .  The term “sanctions” 
was undefined in the 
Liability Policy. . . . Sanctions, 
particularly those for violations of 
discovery rules, are understood to 
be sought by the opposing party 
on motion, while a client’s 
remedy for his or her attorney’s 
errors is a malpractice suit. 
. . .   
The sanctions exclusion in the 
Liability Policy . . . under the 
commonly understood definition 
of sanctions . . . refers to sanctions 
motions brought by opposing 
counsel.  This exclusion does not 
preclude from coverage a 
sanctions petition joined by a 
lawyer’s former client, 
particularly one brought in 
anticipation of a malpractice suit 
based on identical allegations of 
wrongdoing.  The attorney-client 
relationship between Post and 
Mercy indicates that the damages 
Mercy requested in the sanctions 
petition were actually malpractice 
damages, though Mercy termed 
them “sanctions.”  As Post’s 
former client, the facts alleged by 
Mercy in the sanctions petition 
sound in malpractice, even though 
brought under a cause of action 
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for sanctions.  It is the facts in the 
complaint that dictate whether the 
exclusion in the liability policy 
applies, not the cause of action 
selected by Mercy.  If the 
sanctions petition were excluded 
from coverage, Mercy could 
choose whether to proceed with 
an action where Post was covered 
by his insurance carrier, or an 
action where Post was not, and 
potentially be awarded similar 
relief in either action.   
A professional liability insurance 
carrier should not be able to avoid 
coverage for what is essentially a 
malpractice claim simply because 
of how an attorney’s former client 
chooses to term the requested 
relief.  Because the sanctions 
exclusion in the liability policy 
was unclear, it must be construed 
in favor of the insured.  Therefore, 
the sanctions petition was not 
excluded from coverage under the 
liability policy after Mercy joined 
the sanctions petition and 
[Travelers] had a duty to defend 
Post at that time.  [Travelers] 
breached [its] duty to defend Post 
under the Liability Policy and [is] 
therefore liable for breach of 
contract. 
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 On January 23, 2009, the District Court entered an 
order expressly granting Travelers permission to file a 
renewed summary judgment motion as to bad faith.  Travelers 
did so on February 9.  It asserted that an insurer cannot be 
held liable for bad faith when, as here, its denial of coverage 
rests on a reasonable foundation and is fairly debatable; 
rather, an insurer can only be found to have acted in bad faith 
if its refusal to provide coverage was frivolous, unfounded, or 
based on a motive of self-interest or ill will.     
 On March 31, the District Court entered an 
Explanation And Order granting Travelers’ motion for 
summary judgment as to Post’s bad faith claim.  It reasoned:      
Post, though he makes many 
allegations of misconduct on the 
part of [Travelers], cannot prove 
that [Travelers] did not have a 
reasonable basis to deny coverage 
. . . .  [T]hough I previously held 
that coverage of the 
Sanctions Petition was required, 
[Travelers] had a reasonable basis 
to deny coverage.  [It] denied 
coverage to Post because the 
Sanctions Petition requested relief 
in the form of sanctions, which 
. . . were excluded from the 
Liability Policy. . . . I find that 
[Travelers’] denial of coverage 
was not legally frivolous or 
unfounded.  Post cannot maintain 
a claim for bad faith even if his 
allegations of improper conduct 
are true because the sanctions 
exclusion in the Liability Policy 
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was a reasonable basis for 
denying coverage.     
Post filed a motion for reconsideration of this grant of 
summary judgment on his bad faith claim, which the Court 
denied.     
 In May 2009, Post withdrew Counts II and IV of the 
amended complaint. Thereafter, the District Court presided 
over a bench trial to determine the amount of damages to 
award Post on Count I.  It concluded that he was entitled to 
reimbursement in the amount of $921,862.38, which 
represented the work relating directly to Mercy’s potential 
malpractice claim beginning on October 12, 2005, and the 
work done relating to the sanctions petition after 
November 21, 2005.      
 Post now appeals the entry of summary judgment on 
his bad faith claim.  Travelers cross-appeals from the damage 
award on the breach of contract claim.1
II. Discussion 
 
 A. Standard of Review
 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo.  
Azur v. Chase Bank, USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 601 F.3d 212, 216 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  “To that end, we are required to apply the same 
test the [D]istrict [C]ourt should have utilized initially.”  
  
                                              
1 The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332 based on the diversity of citizenship between 
the parties and the fact that the amount in controversy 
exceeds $75,000.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  
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Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of 
Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  This test requires a court to “grant 
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  “In determining whether such relief is 
warranted, ‘[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, 
and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’”  
Chambers, 587 F.3d at 181 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).  The inquiry is 
“whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to 
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that 
one party must prevail as a matter of law.”  Anderson, 477 
U.S. at 251-52.   
 “We may affirm the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment on any grounds supported by the record.”  
Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc).  
“To the extent that the District Court made conclusions of 
law, our review is de novo.”  In re Merck & Co., Inc. Sec., 
Derivative & ERISA Litig., 493 F.3d 393, 399 (3d Cir. 2007).  
We thus review de novo the District Court’s interpretation of 
the Policy.  Alexander v. Nat’l Fire Ins. of Hartford, 454 F.3d 
214, 219 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 We review a district court’s findings of fact following 
a bench trial for clear error.  Am. Soc’y for Testing & 
Materials v. Corrpro Cos., 478 F.3d 557, 566 (3d Cir. 2007).  
In so doing, we “must give due regard to the trial court’s 
opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility.”  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6).  In contrast, we exercise plenary 
review over a trial court’s conclusions of law.  Kosiba v. 
Merck & Co., 384 F.3d 58, 64 (3d Cir. 2004).  We similarly 
exercise plenary review over its “choice and interpretation of 
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legal precepts.”  Blasband v. Rales, 971 F.2d 1034, 1040 (3d 
Cir. 1992).   
 B. 
 The central issue for both Post’s appeal from the 
dismissal of his bad faith claim, and Travelers’ cross-appeal 
of the damage award on Post’s breach of contract claim, is 
whether Travelers had a duty to defend Post in the sanctions 
proceedings.  In short, Post asserts that Travelers owed such a 
duty and denying its defense obligations constituted bad faith; 
as such, he contends that the District Court erred by granting 
summary judgment in Travelers’ favor on the bad faith claim.  
Conversely, Travelers argues that the Policy expressly 
excludes sanctions, and, thus, not only was the denial of 
coverage entirely reasonable and done in good faith, but the 
District Court erred by awarding damages to Post based on 
Travelers’ supposed breach of the Policy.   
Overview of Issues 
 C. The Parties’ Arguments
  1. 
  
 On appeal, Post asserts that the District Court erred by 
granting Travelers’ motion for summary judgment on bad 
faith “because Post had demonstrated that there were 
numerous genuine disputes of material fact which mandated 
the case being submitted to a jury.”  Post contends that he 
produced evidence establishing, among other things, that 
Travelers: 
Post’s Appeal As To Bad Faith 
• ignored Post’s multiple 
notifications of Mercy’s legal 
malpractice claim; 
 
• “loaded the dice” in seeking a 
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formal coverage opinion from 
its outside counsel, who was 
not a member of the 
Pennsylvania bar and who was 
unfamiliar with Pennsylvania 
insurance law, and worse, 
Travelers concealed from its 
outside counsel the existence 
of Mercy’s claim; 
 
• failed to investigate the Mercy 
malpractice claim; 
 
• communicated freely with, and 
favored, Post & Schell at the 
expense of Post; 
 
• provided legal representation 
to Post & Schell, but not to 
Post, under the very same 
insurance policy; 
 
• never responded to Post’s 
demand for coverage of the 
legal malpractice claim as a 
whole; instead, it denied 
coverage based on the more 
narrow issue of the sanctions 
proceeding without regard to 
the pending Mercy claim; 
 
• ignored that the sanctions 
proceeding and the Mercy 
malpractice claim were 
inextricably intertwined, thus 
triggering coverage; 
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• made a bad faith offer to 
compromise Post’s coverage 
claim in exchange for his 
waiving his rights under the 
Policy; 
 
• violated its own policies and 
procedures, as well as 
Pennsylvania law, in its 
mishandling of Post’s claim; 
and 
 
• concealed documents 
(particularly, purported 
claims-handling manuals) 
during discovery in this case. 
 Post argues that “mistreatment by an insurer, quite 
apart from an unreasonable denial of coverage, can itself give 
rise to a claim of bad faith.”  As support for this proposition, 
he cites an unpublished decision of this Court, Gallatin Fuels, 
Inc. v. Westchester Fire Insurance Co., wherein we stated that 
“a finding that the insure[r] d[oes] not ultimately have a duty 
to cover the plaintiff’s claim does not per se make the 
insure[r]’s actions reasonable.”  244 F. App’x 424, 435 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (citing Frog, Switch & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Ins. 
Co., 193 F.3d 742, 751 n.9 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Bad faith is a 
frivolous or unfounded refusal to pay, lack of investigation 
into the facts, or a failure to communicate with the insured.”) 
(emphasis in Gallatin Fuels)).  
 Travelers disagrees with Post’s interpretation of 
Pennsylvania law.  According to Travelers, a bad faith claim 
must consist of the unreasonable and intentional (or reckless) 
denial of benefits.  See UPMC Health Sys. v. Metro Life Ins. 
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Co., 391 F.3d 497, 506 (3d Cir. 2004).  Because it had a 
reasonable basis to deny coverage for the sanctions 
proceedings, Travelers asserts that it did not act in bad faith 
as a matter of law.  Further, it disputes the “evidence” 
purportedly supporting the putative bad faith mishandling of 
Post’s coverage claim, arguing, among other things, that: (1) 
Spinelli first communicated with Post’s counsel—and had a 
“lengthy discussion” with him—within 10 days of receiving 
Bochetto’s November 3, 2005 letter; (2) there is no evidence 
that Post & Schell received more favorable treatment than did 
Post, nor that Travelers favored the firm at Post’s expense; (3) 
Travelers conducted a thorough investigation of Post’s 
coverage claim— Spinelli reviewed the Policy, the sanctions 
petition, Mercy’s answer thereto (once it had been filed), and 
two large binders containing documents from the Bobbett 
case, and he then took the additional step of retaining counsel 
to provide a coverage opinion—and this investigation 
continued well after Travelers declined to provide a defense 
in December 2005; and (4) three Travelers employees 
submitted affidavits attesting that no claims-handling manuals 
existed for the lawyer’s professional group within Travelers 
(the supposedly concealed documents about which Post 
complains).   
  2. Travelers’ Cross-Appeal As To The  
   
 In support of its cross-appeal, Travelers asserts that it 
did not owe a duty to defend Post in the sanctions 
proceedings, explaining that its duty to defend Post is 
determined solely by the allegations in the sanctions petition 
and Mercy’s answer to it, neither of which triggered the duty 
to defend because there was no statement of a claim for 
covered “damages,” but rather a request for “sanctions,” 
which are expressly excluded by the Policy.     
Contractual Damages Award 
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 In response, Post contends that a “demand for 
damages” was made by Mercy in October 2005, and the 
subsequently filed sanctions petition did not eliminate 
Travelers’ duty to investigate and defend Mercy’s malpractice 
claim.  Instead,  
[t]he duty to cover [Mercy’s 
malpractice claim] that arose in 
October 2005 was a single, 
unitary obligation, which 
encompassed the sanctions 
proceeding initiated on November 
21, 2005, but was not defined by 
it.  This is so because[ ] . . . the 
sanctions proceeding was [ ] 
merely a vehicle by which Mercy 
advanced its claim. 
Post also observes that the duty to defend is broader in scope 
than the duty to indemnify, and that coverage provisions are 
to be interpreted broadly while exclusions are to be construed 
narrowly and against the insurer.           
 D. 
 Because our resolution on the merits of the breach of 
contract issue (i.e., whether Travelers owed a duty to defend 
Post under the Policy) affects our determination as to the 
issue of bad faith (i.e., whether Travelers unreasonably and 
intentionally or recklessly denied coverage), we shall analyze 
Post’s breach of contract claim first. 
Analysis 
  1. Breach of Insurance Contract
   a. 
  
Legal Standard 
34 
 
 “Insurance policies are contracts, and the rules of 
contract interpretation provide that the mutual intention of the 
parties at the time they formed the contract governs its 
interpretation.”  Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Jerry’s Sport Ctr., 
Inc., 2 A.3d 526, 540 (Pa. 2010).  “Such intent is to be 
inferred from the written provisions of the contract. . . .  If 
doubt or ambiguity exists it should be resolved in [the] 
insured’s favor.”  Id. (internal citation omitted).  “[A]ll 
provisions of an insurance contract must be read together and 
construed according to the plain meaning of the words 
involved, so as to avoid ambiguity while at the same time 
giving effect to all of its provisions.”  Masters v. Celina Mut. 
Ins. Co., 224 A.2d 774, 776 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1966).   
 As already noted, an insurer’s duty to defend is 
broader than its duty to indemnify.  Am. & Foreign Ins. Co., 2 
A.3d at 540.  It is a distinct obligation, separate and apart 
from the insurer’s duty to provide coverage.  Id. at 541.  “An 
insurer is obligated to defend its insured if the factual 
allegations of the complaint on its face encompass an injury 
that is actually or potentially within the scope of the policy.”  
Id.  See Erie Ins. Exch. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 533 A.2d 
1363, 1368 (Pa. 1987) (describing the duty to defend as 
arising “whenever the complaint filed by the injured party 
may potentially come within the coverage of the policy” 
(emphasis in original)).  “As long as the complaint ‘might or 
might not’ fall within the policy’s coverage, the insurance 
company is obliged to defend.”  Am. & Foreign Ins. Co., 2 
A.3d at 541 (citation omitted).   
 Whether a pleading raises a claim against an insured 
that is potentially covered is a question to be answered by the 
insurer in the first instance upon receiving notice of the claim 
by the insured.  Id.  Although that question may be difficult, it 
is the insurer’s duty to make a decision.  Id. at 541-42.  “The 
insurer’s duty to defend exists until the claim is confined to a 
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recovery that the policy does not cover.”  Id. at 542.  “Where 
a claim potentially may become one which is within the scope 
of the policy, the insurance company’s refusal to defend at the 
outset of the controversy is a decision it makes at its own 
peril.”  Id.     
 The question whether a claim against an insured is 
potentially covered is answered “by comparing the four 
corners of the insurance contract to the four corners of the 
complaint.”  Id. at 541.  “An insurer may not justifiably 
refuse to defend a claim against its insured unless it is clear 
from an examination of the allegations in the complaint and 
the language of the policy that the claim does not potentially 
come within the coverage of the policy.”  Id.  In making this 
determination, the “factual allegations of the underlying 
complaint against the insured are to be taken as true and 
liberally construed in favor of the insured.”   Frog, Switch & 
Mfg. Co., 193 F.3d at 746.  “[T]o determine if there is 
coverage, we must look to the facts alleged in the underlying 
complaint, not the cause of action pled.”  QBE Ins. Corp. v. M 
& S Landis Corp., 915 A.2d 1222, 1225 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) 
(emphasis in original).  The manner in which the complainant 
frames its request for relief does not control.  Mut. Benefit 
Ins. Co. v. Haver, 725 A.2d 743, 745 (Pa. 1999) (“[T]he 
particular cause of action that a complainant pleads is not 
determinative of whether coverage has been triggered.  
Instead it is necessary to look at the factual allegations 
contained in the complaint.”).   
 “Under Pennsylvania law, when an insured tenders 
multiple claims to an insurer for defense, the insurer is 
obligated to undertake defense of the entire suit as long as at 
least one claim is potentially covered by the policy.”  Caplan 
v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey, 68 F.3d 828, 831 
n.1 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Am. Contract Bridge League v. 
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Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 752 F.2d 71, 75 (3d Cir. 
1985). 
   b. 
i. Travelers’ Duty To Defend 
Post Against Mercy’s 
Claim Was Triggered At 
Least As Of October 12, 
2005 
Merits 
 Under the Policy, Travelers had a duty to defend Post 
against any “claim” or “suit” for covered loss.  Because the 
Policy differentiates a “claim” from a “suit,” and because it 
defines a “claim” as simply “a demand that seeks damages,” 
Travelers’ duty to defend could be triggered by something 
short of, and prior to, the filing of a complaint.  See Heffernan 
& Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co. of Am., 614 A.2d 295, 298 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that insurer’s duty to defend was 
triggered by answers to interrogatories because they put 
insurer “on notice that a claim for damage . . . will probably 
be made”).   
 The Policy provides that a claim is considered “to be 
first made or brought” on the date that Travelers or any 
protected person “first receives written notice of such claim.” 
We thus find no error in the District Court’s conclusion that 
Mercy’s malpractice claim was first made or brought on 
October 12, 2005, the date on which Mercy faxed to Post a 
letter blaming him for exposing it to the threat of uninsured 
punitive damages and forcing it to settle the Bobbett case for 
full policy limits in order to avoid such exposure.  As such, 
Travelers’ duty to defend Post in connection with Mercy’s 
malpractice claim was triggered at least as of October 12, 
2005.   
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 While damages were not explicitly demanded in the 
October 12, 2005 letter, Mercy asserted its malpractice claim 
in no uncertain terms.  After learning of Post’s alleged 
misconduct, Mercy quickly terminated him as its counsel.  
Mercy told Post that it would sue him for malpractice.  
Indeed, in the September 25, 2005 conversation between Jim 
Saxton (of Stevens & Lee) and Barton Post (Post’s father), 
wherein Saxton threatened “that he, on behalf of Mercy, was 
going to bring a lawsuit for malpractice against [Post],” 
Saxton also advised that Post should “make arrangements to 
report the claim to [Travelers], the insurance carrier.”  Mercy 
quickly followed up on this conversation by letter, dated 
October 6, 2005, wherein Mercy (1) advised Post that it had 
retained Stevens & Lee as outside counsel to investigate and 
potentially prosecute a legal malpractice claim against him, 
(2) directed Post to preserve relevant documents and 
electronic data in connection with the threatened malpractice 
suit, and (3) requested that Post produce all such relevant 
documents and electronic data to Stevens & Lee.  All this laid 
the groundwork for the October 12 letter, wherein Mercy 
blamed Post for placing it “in a position that demanded 
settlement so as to limit [its] exposure and protect [its] 
charitable assets” from “the substantial potential of uninsured 
punitive exposure resulting from the actions of your firm.”   
 Considering the cumulative effect of all that 
transpired—i.e., Post’s immediate termination as Mercy’s 
counsel, the September 25, 2005 conversation between 
Saxton and Barton Post, and the October 6 and October 12 
letters—it would be fantasy to believe as of October 12 that 
Mercy would not be seeking damages from Post in the 
threatened malpractice suit to compensate it for the excessive 
settlement it believed Post’s misconduct forced on it.  As 
the threatened malpractice suit certainly would have the 
potential to result in a covered loss under the Policy, 
Travelers’ duty to defend Post in connection with Mercy’s 
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malpractice claim was triggered at the latest “on the date that 
[Travelers] or [Post] first receive[d] a written notice” of 
Mercy’s claim—October 12, 2005.      
  Travelers’ contention that Mercy’s letters did not 
trigger a duty to defend because they indicated only a 
“potential” claim underwhelms.  There was nothing 
“potential” about Mercy’s threat to sue Post for malpractice 
or its assertion that Post’s misconduct caused it monetary 
loss.  The definition of “claim” under the Policy does not 
require anything more than a “demand that seeks damages,” 
which Mercy made via its threats and letters.  Indeed, 
Travelers itself viewed its duty to defend as having been 
triggered by Mercy’s letters because it opened a claims file 
for Post and assigned responsibility of the claim to Spinelli, 
who then spent considerable time reviewing numerous 
documents and analyzing the claim.      
    ii. The Scope Of Travelers’  
     Duty To Defend Against  
     The Sanctions Petition Is  
     Limited To The Defense  
     Costs Incurred By Post  
     Subsequent To Mercy’s  
     Filing Of Its Answer On  
     February 8, 2006 
 We part ways with the District Court with regard to the 
scope of Travelers’ defense obligation, as we disagree with its 
holding that Travelers’ duty to defend Post encompassed the 
entirety of the sanctions proceedings (that is, from when they 
were begun by the Bobbetts).   
 Relying on the Policy’s definition of “defense 
expenses”—which includes “[t]he cost of the proceedings 
involved in the suit, including court reporter’s, arbitrator’s, 
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and mediator’s fees”—the District Court explained as 
follows: 
When Mercy joined the sanctions 
petition, the proceedings 
surrounding the petition became 
“involved” in Mercy’s previously 
asserted malpractice claim 
through the potential for collateral 
estoppel effect.  Mercy likely 
joined the sanctions petition, in 
part, to participate in developing 
the facts and/or law that would 
directly impact their malpractice 
suit (assuming the sanctions 
petition did not result in sufficient 
monetary compensation to 
eliminate Mercy’s need to sue for 
malpractice). 
We disagree for at least two reasons.  First, the Court’s 
holding is at odds with the very distinction it (and we) 
recognized between a “claim” and a “suit.”  This distinction 
was critical to its (and our) conclusion that Mercy had 
asserted a covered malpractice “claim” at least as of October 
12, 2005.  But the Court then puts aside this distinction by 
relying on “[t]he cost of the proceedings involved in the suit” 
Policy language to support its view that the sanctions 
proceedings “became ‘involved’ in” Mercy’s malpractice 
claim once Mercy began participating in those proceedings.  
Under the Policy, however, “defense expenses” only include 
costs “involved in the suit,” and neither Mercy’s answer to 
the sanctions petition (February 8, 2006) nor its malpractice 
action against Post (November 19, 2007) had been filed when 
the Bobbetts filed their petition for sanctions against Post on 
November 21, 2005.  Thus, while the sanctions proceedings 
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related to Mercy’s claim, there was as yet no suit that those 
sanctions proceedings could be “involved in.”  The District 
Court therefore erred by concluding, based on Mercy’s 
participation in conference calls with Judge Olszewski and its 
insisting on receiving copies of all discovery produced in the 
sanctions proceedings, “that Mercy became sufficiently 
involved in the [sanctions] [p]etition to have ‘joined’ the 
proceedings from the day the [p]etition was filed, on 
November 21, 2005.”  No amount of participation by Mercy 
in the sanctions proceedings would be sufficient prior to the 
filing of a “suit”—which means under the Policy “a civil 
proceeding that seeks damages”—a prerequisite to Travelers’ 
liability.  As noted below, that prerequisite was satisfied on 
February 8, 2006, the date on which Mercy filed its answer to 
the sanctions petition and sought damages against Post.   
Second, the District Court’s conclusion goes against 
two canons of contract interpretation.  Under the principle of 
ejusdem generis, “[i]t is widely accepted that general 
expressions such as ‘including, but not limited to’ that 
precede a specific list of included items should not be 
construed in their widest context, but apply only to persons or 
things of the same general kind or class as those specifically 
mentioned in the list of examples.”  McClellan v. Health 
Maint. Org. of Pa., 686 A.2d 801, 805 (Pa. 1996).  Similarly, 
“[t]he ancient maxim ‘noscitur a sociis’ summarizes the rule 
that the meaning of words may be indicated or controlled by 
those words with which they are associated.  Words are 
known by the company they keep.”  Northway Vill. No. 3, 
Inc. v. Northway Props., Inc., 244 A.2d 47, 50 (Pa. 1968).  
The “cost of the proceedings involved in the suit” includes 
“court reporter’s, arbitrator’s, and mediator’s fees,” 
not attorneys’ fees.  Attorneys’ fees traditionally are 
distinguished from costs.  See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d) 
(differentiating between “costs” and “attorney’s fees”).  The 
Policy recognizes this distinction, addressing attorneys’ fees 
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in a separate bullet-point in the definition of “defense 
expenses.”   
In this context—i.e., in the absence of a “suit” (“a civil 
proceeding that [sought] damages”)—the Policy’s “involved 
in” language cannot apply.  Hence, Travelers did not owe a 
duty to defend Post in connection with the sanctions petition 
at the time the petition was filed by the Bobbetts on 
November 21, 2005. 
 However, Mercy’s answer to the sanctions petition, 
filed on February 8, 2006 and which included a prayer for 
relief requesting “any other relief [that] this Court deems just 
and equitable under the unique and serious circumstances 
presented before it, and award costs, attorneys’ fees and 
expenses,” triggered coverage under the Policy.  While Mercy 
did not explicitly request “damages” as an item of relief, the 
prayer in its answer did generally request “any other [just and 
equitable] relief” as well as “costs, attorneys’ fees and 
expenses.”  It is debatable whether the general prayer for 
“other relief” rendered Mercy’s answer a “civil proceeding 
that seeks damages.”  Compare Meth v. Meth, 62 A.2d 848, 
849 (Pa. 1949) (“Under the prayer for general relief, a decree 
which accords with the equities of the cause may be shaped 
and rendered; the court may grant any appropriate relief that 
conforms to the case made by the pleadings although it is not 
exactly the relief which [h]as been asked for[.]”), with Baird 
v. First Pa. Bank, N.A., 1 Pa. D. & C. 3d 665, 666, 1976 WL 
491, at *1 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1976) (holding that a request for 
“such other equitable relief as the Court deems appropriate” 
is, by itself, no claim for relief at all, and requiring the 
plaintiff to amend the complaint).  Mercy’s specific request 
for “costs, attorneys’ fees and expenses” nonetheless was 
sufficient to do so because attorneys’ fees—both amounts 
paid by the client to the negligent attorney as well as expenses 
incurred by the client to prosecute its malpractice claim 
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against the attorney—are an item of damages in a legal 
malpractice claim.  See Bailey v. Tucker, 621 A.2d 108, 115 
(Pa. 1993) (holding that plaintiff in legal malpractice action 
could recover amounts paid to his attorney as damages); Feld 
and Sons, Inc. v. Pechner, Dorfman, Wolfee, Rounick, and 
Cabot, 458 A.2d 545, 554 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (stating that 
clients could recover fees paid to their lawyer who violated 
professional obligations owed to clients); 3 Ronald E. Mallen 
& Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 21.6, at 22-26 
(2009) (attorneys’ fees incurred in legal malpractice action 
may be recoverable as consequential damages).  Because 
Mercy requested its attorneys’ fees as an item of relief in its 
February 8, 2006 answer to the sanctions petition, the 
sanctions proceeding at that time became a “civil proceeding 
that [sought] damages,” and thus a “suit,” thereby triggering 
coverage under the Policy. 
 In addition, Mercy’s answer to the sanctions petition 
(in reality, its joining with the Bobbetts against Post, Reid, 
Barton Post, and Post & Post) admitted and/or alleged facts 
potentially giving rise to a covered malpractice claim under 
the Policy.  Mercy admitted and/or alleged that Post was its 
former counsel, that he failed to exercise ordinary skill or 
knowledge by unethically and improperly redacting and/or 
withholding discoverable information, and that his failure to 
exercise ordinary skill and knowledge subjected him to 
sanctions and liability for attorneys’ fees—in essence, stating 
the elements of a malpractice claim.  See Bailey, 621 A.2d at 
112 (explaining that, to state a claim for legal malpractice 
under Pennsylvania law, an aggrieved client must allege that: 
(1) the parties were in an attorney-client relationship; (2) the 
attorney failed to exercise ordinary skill or knowledge; and 
(3) the attorney’s failure to exercise ordinary skill and 
knowledge was the proximate cause of damage to the client).   
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 Moreover, because (1) Mercy sought damages in 
addition to sanctions, and (2) the facts admitted and alleged 
by Mercy in its answer to the sanctions petition stated a 
potentially covered malpractice claim, the Policy’s sanctions 
exclusion does not shield Travelers from its duty to defend 
Post.  See Caplan, 68 F.3d at 831 n.1 (“Under Pennsylvania 
law, when an insured tenders multiple claims to an insurer for 
defense, the insurer is obligated to undertake defense of the 
entire suit as long as at least one claim is potentially covered 
by the policy.”).  This exclusion would only excuse 
Travelers’ duty to defend Post if the possibility of Mercy’s 
recovery could be confined solely to sanctions.  See Am. 
Contract Bridge, 752 F.2d at 75 (“the insurer is obligated to 
fully defend its insured until it can confine the possibility of 
recovery to claims outside the coverage of the policy”).  
Mercy’s potential recovery could not be so confined.   
    iii. The Policy Does Not Cover 
     Post v. Mercy 
 We believe also the District Court should not have 
held that Post’s suit against Mercy—filed in Philadelphia 
County in February 2008—was covered under the Policy on 
the basis that it was inextricably intertwined with Mercy’s 
malpractice claim against Post.   
 Had Post asserted counterclaims in Mercy’s suit 
against him, no doubt the expenses incurred by him to 
prosecute the counterclaims would have been covered by the 
Policy.  See TIG Ins. Co. v. Nobel Learning Cmtys., No. Civ. 
A. 01-4708, 2002 WL 1340332, at *14-15 (E.D. Pa. June 18, 
2002) (holding that counterclaims that were inextricably 
intertwined with the defense of the initial claims were 
“logically encompassed” by duty to defend); Safeguard 
Scientifics, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 766 F. Supp. 324, 
333-34 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that the insurer’s duty to 
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defend extended to counterclaims raised in the same 
proceeding because “the pursuit of the counterclaims was 
inextricably intertwined with the defense . . . and was 
necessary to the defense of the litigation as a strategic 
matter”).   
 However, Post did not simply assert counterclaims in 
the same proceeding; rather, he filed a separate civil action in 
a different venue.  While Post’s new action in Philadelphia 
County surely related to the case instituted by Mercy in 
Luzerne County, to hold that Post’s separate action was 
covered by the Policy simply because it related to Mercy’s 
suit would condone, and perhaps even encourage, the 
multiplicity of litigation.  Such a holding also would place 
insurers in the difficult and unenviable situation of having to 
determine whether related cases are related enough—i.e., 
“inextricably intertwined”—to trigger coverage for the 
insured’s counterclaims.  Both of these results are highly 
undesirable and, therefore, we cannot adopt such a rule.   
 As Judge Savage persuasively stated in Amquip Corp. 
v. Admiral Insurance Co., 
[i]f courts were to consider the 
costs an insured incurred by 
instituting its own action for the 
purpose of bringing pressure on 
the other party under the guise of 
a litigation defense, it would 
encourage and endorse 
multiplicity of litigation.  This is 
much different than requiring the 
insurer to reimburse the insured 
for the cost of prosecuting 
counterclaims raised in the same 
action. 
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No. Civ. A. 03-4411, 2005 WL 742457, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 
31, 2005)(Savage, J.).   
 Rather than require insurers to decide whether they 
have a duty to cover an insured’s expenses in a separate 
action based on a highly contextual and subjective inquiry 
into whether it is “sufficiently related to the underlying 
action” (the rule that the District Court applied here), Amquip 
provides a bright-line and sensible rule that an insurer has a 
duty to cover an insured’s expenses for prosecuting 
counterclaims in the initial proceeding, but that insurer has no 
duty to cover the expenses incurred by an insured in 
prosecuting an entirely new and separate action (even if that 
action is related to the underlying case).   While there 
certainly may be tactical reasons for an insured to file a 
related suit in a different venue, we believe that discouraging 
multiple litigation and providing clear coverage guidelines for 
insurers are more important considerations.  The rule in 
Amquip will provide clarity to insurers and insureds, as well 
as conserve their legal costs and expenses (not to mention 
judicial resources), and thus will better serve insurance 
coverage litigants.  Because Amquip provides a better rule of 
law, we hereby adopt it.   
 Accordingly, Travelers is not required to cover the 
expenses incurred by Post in connection with the separate 
action he filed against Mercy in Philadelphia County.   
   c. 
  Travelers owed Post a duty to defend against (1) 
Mercy’s malpractice claim from October 12, 2005 onward, 
and (2) the sanctions petition subsequent to the filing of 
Mercy’s answer on February 8, 2006.  However, Travelers is 
not liable for the expenses incurred by Post in connection 
with the separate action he filed in Philadelphia County. 
Conclusion Re Duty To Defend 
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  2. 
   a. 
Insurance Bad Faith 
 To recover for bad faith, “a plaintiff must show by 
clear and convincing evidence that the insurer (1) did not 
have a reasonable basis for denying benefits under the policy 
and (2) knew or recklessly disregarded its lack of a 
reasonable basis in denying the claim.”  Condio v. Erie Ins. 
Exch., 899 A.2d 1136, 1143 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).  “Thus, an 
insurer may defeat a claim of bad faith by showing that it had 
a reasonable basis for its actions.”  Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Fogel, 656 F.3d 167, 179 (3d Cir. 2011).  “[T]he essence of a 
bad faith claim” is “the unreasonable and intentional (or 
reckless) denial of benefits.”  UPMC Health Sys., 391 F.3d at 
506. 
Legal Standard 
 The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has explained: 
“Bad faith” on [the] part of [an] 
insurer is any frivolous or 
unfounded refusal to pay proceeds 
of a policy; it is not necessary that 
such refusal be fraudulent. For 
purposes of an action against an 
insurer for failure to pay a claim, 
such conduct imports a dishonest 
purpose and means a breach of a 
known duty (i.e., good faith and 
fair dealing), through some 
motive of self-interest or ill will; 
mere negligence or bad judgment 
is not bad faith.  
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Terletsky v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 649 A.2d 680, 
688 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 
139 (6th ed. 1990)).   
 “A reasonable basis is all that is required to defeat a 
claim of bad faith.”  J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co. v. Pilosi, 
393 F.3d 356, 367 (3d Cir. 2004).  Moreover, “mere 
negligence or bad judgment does not constitute bad faith; 
knowledge or reckless disregard of a lack of a basis for denial 
of coverage is necessary.”  Frog, Switch & Mfg., 193 F.3d at 
751 n.9.   
 While an insurer has a duty to accord the interests of 
its insured the same consideration it gives its own interests, 
“an insurer is not bound to submerge its own interest in order 
that the insured’s interests may be made paramount, and an 
insurer does not act in bad faith by investigating and litigating 
legitimate issues of coverage.”  J.C. Penney, 393 F.3d at 368 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).    
 Even questionable conduct giving the appearance of 
bad faith is not sufficient to establish it so long as the insurer 
had a reasonable basis to deny coverage.  Id. (affirming 
summary judgment in insurer’s favor on bad faith claim 
because there was a reasonable basis to deny coverage, even 
though insurer took inconsistent coverage positions in other 
situations and made false statements in its marketing 
materials).  See O’Donnell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 734 A.2d 901, 
906-10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (explaining that, while bad faith 
“may also extend to the insurer’s investigative practices,” in 
the absence of evidence of a dishonest purpose or ill will, it is 
not bad faith for an insurer to take a stand with a reasonable 
basis or to “aggressively investigate and protect its interests”).   
 Bad faith “must be proven by clear and convincing 
evidence and not merely insinuated.”  Terletsky, 649 A.2d at 
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688.  This heightened standard requires evidence “so clear, 
direct, weighty and convincing as to enable a clear 
conviction, without hesitation, about whether or not the 
defendants acted in bad faith.”  Bostick v. ITT Hartford Grp., 
56 F. Supp. 2d 580, 587 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (citations omitted).  
“Thus, the plaintiff’s burden in opposing a summary 
judgment motion is commensurately high in light of the 
substantive evidentiary burden at trial.”  J.C. Penney, 393 
F.3d at 367.  “In a bad faith case, summary judgment [in 
favor of the insurer] is appropriate when there is no clear and 
convincing evidence that [its] conduct was unreasonable and 
that it knew or recklessly disregarded its lack of a reasonable 
basis in denying the claim.”  Bostick, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 587.     
   b.  
 The District Court correctly granted summary 
judgment in favor of Travelers on Post’s insurance bad faith 
claim brought pursuant to 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8371.  The 
sanctions exclusion in the Policy provided Travelers a 
reasonable basis for declining to provide a defense to Post, 
and there is nothing in the record—let alone clear and 
convincing evidence—indicating that Travelers’ purported 
mishandling of Post’s claim was motivated by a dishonest 
purpose or ill will.     
Merits 
 With his primary bad faith argument foreclosed by our 
(and the District Court’s) conclusion that Travelers had a 
reasonable basis for declining coverage, Post asserts that 
Travelers engaged in bad faith conduct by, among other 
things, ignoring communications from the insured, violating 
its own policies and procedures, agreeing to pay for defense 
counsel for Post & Schell but not him, and keeping crucial 
information from Anesh as he made his coverage 
determination.  This mishandling of his claim, Post contends, 
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is a basis for finding bad faith, irrespective of the final 
decision on the issue of coverage.   
 In support of his contention, Post principally relies on 
our non-precedential case of Gallatin Fuels, Inc. v. 
Westchester Fire Insurance Co., which he cites for the 
proposition that “a finding that the insure[r] did not ultimately 
have a duty to cover the plaintiff’s claim does not per se make 
the insure[r]’s actions reasonable.”  244 F. App’x at 435.  
While that statement is no doubt true, Post’s reliance on 
Gallatin Fuels is misplaced. 
 As explained above, while under Pennsylvania law bad 
faith may extend to an insurer’s investigation and other 
conduct in handling the claim, that conduct must “import a 
dishonest purpose.”  Brown v. Progressive Ins. Co., 860 A.2d 
493, 501 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted).   Invariably, this requires that the insurer lack 
a reasonable basis for denying coverage, as mere negligence 
or aggressive protection of an insurer’s interests is not bad 
faith.  See Frog, Switch & Mfg., 193 F.3d at 751 n.9 
(explaining that “mere negligence or bad judgment does not 
constitute bad faith”); O’Donnell, 734 A.2d at 910 
(explaining that an insurer may “aggressively investigate and 
protect its interests”).         
 Indeed, Gallatin Fuels underscores this rule.  In that 
case, both the insurer and the insured mistakenly believed that 
the insurance policy remained in full force when, in fact, the 
policy had been canceled.  244 F. App’x at 427-28.  Before 
realizing that the policy had been canceled, however, the 
insurer denied the insured’s claim without a reasonable basis.  
Id. at 428.  The insurer also “misrepresented the terms of the 
policy, dragged its feet in the investigation of the claim, hid 
information from [the insured], and continued to shift its basis 
for denying the claims.”  Id. at 435.  Based on these facts, we 
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held that “a jury could have found—and, indeed, did find—
that [the insurer] acted in bad faith given its working 
assumption that the policy had not been canceled.”  Id.  
Because of the misrepresentations and dishonesty of the 
insurer in denying the claim without a reasonable basis for 
doing so (though there was a reason about which the insurer 
did not yet know), we cautioned that Gallatin Fuels was “one 
of the exceedingly rare cases in which an insurer can be liable 
for bad faith” even though there was no duty to provide 
coverage.   See id.   
 That is not the case here, where Post assails largely 
benign claims-handling conduct—conduct that certainly does 
not “import a dishonest purpose”—simply because he 
disagrees with Travelers’ decision to deny coverage on the 
plausible basis that the sanctions exclusion precluded 
coverage.  Thus, Gallatin Fuels would not be helpful to 
Post’s case even were it precedential.  See generally 3d Cir. 
I.O.P. 5.7 (“The court by tradition does not cite to its not 
precedential opinions as authority. Such opinions are not 
regarded as precedents that bind the court because they do not 
circulate to the full court before filing.”).   
 Post also relies on Giangreco v. United States Life 
Insurance Co., 168 F. Supp. 2d 417 (E.D. Pa. 2001).  The 
relevant issue there was whether an intoxication exclusion in 
a car insurance policy provided the insurer a reasonable basis 
to deny coverage.  See id. at 422-23.  On learning that the 
insured was intoxicated, the insurer denied coverage, a 
decision it stuck to despite evidence later uncovered that the 
insured did not cause the accident and may not have been able 
to avoid it even if unimpaired.  Id. at 422-23.  The District 
Court denied the insurer’s motion for summary judgment as 
to the bad faith claim, reasoning that a jury could reasonably 
conclude “that [the insurer] denied plaintiffs’ claim without 
conducting a reasonable investigation and without a 
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reasonable basis.  It would not be unreasonable to conclude 
. . . that [the insurer] reflexively denied the claim upon 
learning that the insured was intoxicated without 
meaningfully pursuing issues of causation.”  Id. at 423. 
 Citing Giangreco, Post argues that Travelers 
reflexively denied coverage by relying on the sanctions 
exclusion in the Policy and “latching onto the subsequent 
filing of the sanctions proceedings as an excuse for 
disclaiming coverage of the broader malpractice claim.”  But 
the record belies this argument.  Travelers did not 
automatically deny coverage, as evidenced by, among other 
things: (1) Spinelli’s review of, and work performed in 
connection with, Post’s coverage claim; (2) Travelers’ 
retention of Anesh as outside counsel to provide a coverage 
opinion (even though the documents provided were not 
comprehensive); (3) Travelers’ reconsideration of its 
declining coverage; (4) its continued investigation into the 
coverage issues; (5) the extensive and ongoing dialogue 
among Spinelli, Anesh, and Bochetto; and (6) Travelers’ 
negotiations with Bochetto resulting in its compromise offer 
and letter agreement to cover a portion of Post’s defense 
expenses.  Further, unlike in Giangreco where the insurer’s 
reasonable basis to deny coverage disappeared in light of new 
evidence, Travelers’ reasonable basis remained.  Giangreco is 
thus distinguishable.      
   c. Conclusion Re Bad Faith
  Travelers did not frivolously decline to provide a 
defense to Post; rather, after an investigation and retention of 
outside counsel, Travelers reasonably concluded that the 
sanctions exclusion in the Policy applied to Post’s claim and 
denied coverage.  Even if Travelers’ claims-handling 
processes were not ideal, there is no evidence in the record—
let alone clear and convincing evidence—to indicate that 
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Travelers’ purported mishandling of Post’s claim was 
motivated by a dishonest purpose or ill will.  Because it 
performed what appears to be an adequate investigation, and 
because the sanctions exclusion in the Policy provided it a 
reasonable basis for denying coverage, Travelers did not 
engage in insurance bad faith.  
* * * * * 
While we affirm the District Court’s March 31, 2009 
Order (Dist. Ct. ECF No. 109) granting summary judgment in 
Travelers’ favor on Post’s bad faith claim, we vacate its July 
6, 2010 Order (Dist. Ct. ECF No. 193) entering judgment in 
Post’s favor in the amount of $921,862.38 on the breach of 
contract claim.  Under the Policy, Travelers is responsible for 
all costs incurred by Post in connection with Mercy’s 
malpractice claim from October 12, 2005 forward and for all 
costs incurred by Post to defend the sanctions proceedings 
from February 8, 2006 forward.   
With respect to those defense costs incurred by Post 
related to the malpractice claim, due to the broad scope of an 
insurer’s duty to defend, Travelers is liable for all of Post’s 
defense costs except for those costs that relate solely to the 
Bobbetts’ sanctions petition.  Travelers is liable for all of 
Post’s defense costs incurred from February 8, 2006 that 
relate to the malpractice claim and/or the sanctions 
proceedings.  However, Travelers is not liable for the 
expenses incurred by Post with respect to the separate action 
he filed against Mercy in Philadelphia.   
We remand the case to the District Court to recalculate 
the amount of fees and expenses incurred by Post that are to 
be reimbursed by Travelers.     
1 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part. 
 I agree with Judge Ambro’s excellent opinion for the 
Court in all respects save one.  Unlike my colleagues, I would 
hold that Travelers owed no duty to defend any portion of the 
sanctions proceeding the Bobbetts initiated against attorney 
Post. 
 As the majority notes, the Policy excluded sanctions 
from coverage, stating that Travelers would not “consider 
damages to include any: civil or criminal fines, forfeitures, 
penalties or sanctions.”  And the Bobbetts’ petition bore all 
the hallmarks of a typical motion for disciplinary sanctions.  
See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 1458 (9th ed. 2009) 
(defining “sanction” as “[a] penalty or coercive measure that 
results from failure to comply with a law, rule, or order” and 
listing as an example “a sanction for discovery abuse”).  
Thus, I concur that Mercy’s informal participation in the 
sanctions proceedings could not impose on Travelers a duty 
to defend Post in those proceedings.  I part ways with the 
majority with respect to whether Mercy’s answer to the 
Bobbetts’ petition converted the sanctions proceeding into a 
“suit” as defined by the Policy, that is, “a civil proceeding 
that seeks damages.” 
 The majority concludes that Mercy’s boilerplate prayer 
for relief—which requested that the court impose 
“sanction[s]” and “any other relief[] this Court deems just and 
equitable under the unique and serious circumstances 
presented before it, and award costs, attorneys’ fees and 
expenses”—sought “damages” because attorneys’ fees are 
recoverable in a suit for legal malpractice.  The majority 
further reasons that Mercy “in essence” stated the elements of 
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a legal malpractice claim through its admissions in its answer.  
In support of this view, the majority cites cases involving 
legal malpractice lawsuits.  See Bailey, 621 A.2d 108; Feld & 
Sons, 458 A.2d 545.  While it is undoubtedly true that 
plaintiffs who bring such lawsuits may obtain compensatory 
damages that include attorneys’ fees, I find no authority for 
the proposition that a plaintiff may pursue such relief merely 
by responding to a sanctions petition with averments that 
might, in a separate lawsuit, form the basis for a legal 
malpractice claim.  Indeed, the District Court correctly 
recognized that “[s]anctions, particularly those for violations 
of discovery rules, are understood to be sought by the 
opposing party on motion, while a client’s remedy for his or 
her attorney’s errors is a malpractice suit.”  (App. 1221–22); 
cf. Rohm & Haas Co. v. Lin, 992 A.2d 132 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2010) (“[T]he purpose of discovery sanctions is to secure 
compliance with our discovery rules and court orders in order 
to move the case forward and protect the substantive rights of 
the parties, while holding those who violate such rules and 
orders accountable.”). 
The Pennsylvania Superior Court has recognized the 
fundamental distinction between disciplinary sanctions and 
compensatory damages: 
Sanctions, including monetary sanctions paid to 
an adversary in the form of fees or costs, 
address the interests of the court and not those 
of the individual.  A litigant cannot rely on a 
sanction motion to seek compensation for every 
injury that the sanctionable conduct produces.  
Rather, an injured party must request tort 
damages to protect his personal interest in being 
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free from unreasonable interference with his 
person and property. 
Werner v. Plater-Zyberk, 799 A.2d 776, 784 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2002) (citations omitted).  Under the majority’s reasoning, 
Mercy could have obtained damages caused by Post’s 
negligence without ever proving to a judge or jury the 
elements of legal malpractice.  Such an award would be 
unprecedented in my experience. 
Moreover, an innocent explanation for Mercy’s 
participation in the sanctions proceeding belies the majority’s 
inference that Mercy’s true objective in that proceeding was 
to obtain compensation for Post’s malpractice.  The state 
court required Mercy to file a responsive pleading as the price 
of admission to participate in the sanctions proceeding, which 
implicated not only Mercy’s former outside counsel, but also 
its own employees and corporate documents.  In fact, Mercy 
indicated in its opposition to Post’s motion to strike its 
answer that it intervened because it “was required to 
participate in the search, review and production of 
documents, and to produce witnesses for depositions.” 
For these reasons, I would hold that Travelers owed 
Post no duty to defend the sanctions proceeding, even after 
Mercy filed its answer. 
